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ADDRESSING COPYRIGHT AND PATENT
AS SOFTWARE'S LEGAL AEGIS:
A REVIEW OF SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION
Alan M. Fischl
SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION. By Bernard A.
Galler.n Quorum Books. 1995. pp. X, 205, index. ISBN: 0-89930-974-7.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer software permeates daily life in modem American society. In
addition to its many obvious uses, such as the operation of the world's
financial institutions and the control of air traffic, software also pervades the
most ubiquitous consumer products, including the automobile (30,000 lines
of software), television (500 kilobytes of software), and even the electric
shaver (two kilobytes of software).' Accordingly, rules and regulations
addressing the creation, distribution, and use of software impact everyone.2
t Mr. Fisch is an associate at Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C. He earned his law
degree cum laude from Tulane Law School in 1994, and his undergraduate degree in
Computer Science from the University of Texas at Austin in 1988. Mr. Fisch previously
worked at the United States Patent and Trademark Office from 1994 to 1996. The opinions
expressed herein are those of the author and should not be imputed to any other individual or
organization.
n Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
ISee W. Wayt Gibbs, Software's Chronic Crisis, ScI. AM., Sept. 1994, at 86, 88. The
reach of the software octopus will continue to groxw-the amount of software in consumer
products doubles every two years. Id. (citing Remi H. Bourgonjon, Director of Research,
Phillips Research Laboratory in Eiondhoven).
See generally MAX LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 964 (30th Anniversary ed.
19a7) ("In the decades ahead [computers and telecommunications] are likely to prove a
watershed in defining the American and his conduct."). Policy makers and elected officials are
also keenly aware of the importance of software to society. See generally NEWT GINGRICH, To
RENEW AMERICA 7-8 (1995) ('We must accelerate America's entry into the Third Wave
Information Age.... If we can grasp the true significance of these [scientific and technologic]
changes, we can lead the world into the Information Age and leave our children a country
unmatched in wealth, power, and opportunity."); Albert Gore, Jr., Infrastructure for the Global
Village, ScI. AM., Sept. 1991, at 150 ("There is no longer any doubt that [computers] will
reshape human civilization even more quickly and more thoroughly than did the printing
press.").
2 One commentator recently referred to software as "foremost among the valuable and
technologically sophisticated information-based products that bear the hallmarks of an
intellectual good." Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on
Global Computer Networks, 68 TuL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1993). Another commentator recently
dubbed software as the "crownjewels of the information economy." ANN WELLS BRANSCOMB,
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In this light, Professor Bernard A. Galler's recent book Software and Intellec-
tual Property Protection3 warrants review.
As a professor of computer science, not law, Galler gives voice to a
unique perspective of software intellectual property protection. With this
book, Galler places himself in a small cadre of scientists and engineers, which
sans formal legal training, engage in legal scholarship regarding intellectual
property protection and software.4 Although not an attorney, Galler is no
tenderfoot in the field he explores; he founded and currently serves as presi-
dent and trustee of the Software Patent Institute, an organization dedicated to
improving Patent Office examination of software-related inventions.' Further,
Galler brings to the discussion his observations as an expert witness in some
landmark software copyright cases, 6 including Apple v. Microsoft,7 Lotus
Development v. Paperback Software International,' and NEC v. Intel.9
While Galler describes Software and Intellectual Property Protection
as a guide to complex legal issues for both attorneys and computer
WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLIC ACCESS 157 (1994) (hereinafter
BRANSCOMB).
3 BERNARD A. GALLER, SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION (1995)
(hereinafter GALLER).
4 See, e.g., Randall Davis, The Nature ofSoftware and Its Consequences for Establishing
and Evaluating Similarity, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 299 (1992); James R. Goodman et al., Toward
a Fact-Based Standard for Determining Whether Programmed Computers are Patentable
Subject Matter: The Scientific Wisdom of Alappat and Ignorance of Trovato, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 353 (1995); Allen Newell, Response: The Models are Broken, the
Models are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1923 (1986); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994)
(hereinafter Samuelson, Manifesto) (co-authors include Randall Davis and Mitchell D. Kapor).
I The objectives of the Software Patent Institute (SPI) include compiling a software
technology prior art database and providing software technology lectures for Patent Examiners.
Activity Reports for Spring and Summer 1994, THE SPI REP., Summer/Fall 1994, at 4. In his
capacity as SPI president, Galler testified at a 1994 hearing held by the Patent Office regarding
software based inventions. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Public Hearings on Patent
Protection for Software-Related Inventions, Feb. 10-11, 1994, at 58, reprinted in 1157
OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 99, and in 58 Fed. Reg. 22,152 (1994).
' In addition to the cases cited in the text, Professor Galler participated in many suits
involving software and intellectual property. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 78,96 (D. Mass. 1992) (brief in the book found at page 100); Allen-Myland, Inc.
v. IBM, 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (brief in the book found at page 57).
Professor Galler is not alone as an expert witness in intellectual property law cases who has
written a book about the collective experience. See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993).
'35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
8740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
9 WL 67434 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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scientists,' ° this review is written from a legal perspective. The book's more
than 200 pages consist of an introduction, ten legal instructional chapters, a
chapter eleven conclusion, four appendices, a recommended reading list, and
an index. Apart from the introduction and Chapter 11 conclusion, the
remaining chapters each address individual copyright or patent law topics.
II. EN TOTO ANALYSIS
Before delving into the specifics of the ten instructional chapters, this
review first examines the book from a broad perspective. Section mII of this
review provides a detailed analysis of chapters 1 through 10.
A. THE BOOK'S NARROWED SCOPE
In the introduction chapter," Galler announces that the book will focus
exclusively on copyright law and patent law. 3 He then explains that the
decision to narrow the book's scope from the totality of intellectual property
law,14 as the title promises, 5 rests in his assessment that software "fits rather
'oGALLER, supra note 3, at X.
"Id. at 1-4.
2In broad terms, a copyright protects original expression. The basis of the United States
copyright system is Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution which grants Congress the
authority to enact legislation: "[tlo promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience .... , by securing for
limited [t]imes to [a]uthors... the exclusive [r]ight to their.... [w]ritings." The statutory core
ofthe copyright system is found at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1994), amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514(c), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (amending sections
104A and 109, and adding section 1101). The executive agency administering the system is the
Librarian of Congress. 17 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). Regulations are found at 37 C.F.R. §§ 201-
204 (1995). Judicial administration of the system is through the federal courts, where cases of
infringement begin in the district court, are appealed to the geographically appropriate circuit
court, and are ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
3 In broad terms, a utility patent protects new, useful, and non-obvious ideas. The basis
of the United States patent system is Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution which
grants Congress the authority to enact legislation: "[t]o promote the progress of ... useful arts,
by securing for limited [t]imes to ... [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their ...
[d]iscoveries .. ."). The statutory core of the patent regime is found at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376
(1994), amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 531, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994) (amending scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The executive agency administering
the system is the Patent and Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994). The bulk of
regulations are found at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1-15a (1995). Judicial administration generally begins
at the federal district court, and ultimately ends with the Supreme Court, as with copyright The
first appellate level, however, is unusual. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit hears all appeals resulting from patent law infringement cases, regardless of the
geographic location ofthe initial district court case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1),(4),(8) (1994).
"4 The forms of intellectual property protection include: patent, copyright, trademark,
trade secret, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, the right of publicity, and
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well under existing law" of these two regimes. 6 The book acknowledges
trade secret law's applicability to software, but declines to expand on this
point, finding "little in that area that is peculiar to the computer." 7 Not-
withstanding this assertion, the sub-set of federal 8 trademark law devoted to
protecting trade dress,' 9 deserves attention.2"
Federal trade dress protection, based on Section 43(a) of the Lanham
(Federal Trademark) Act,21 guards "the total image of a product and may
include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, or even a particular sales technique." '22 Trade dress law has applied
outside the context of software since its inception,23 and serves an important
public protection role by reducing confusion regarding a good's origin.
Commentators have recently addressed the expansion of trade dress jurispru-
dence to software displays.24 This further application of trade dress theory
contracts for the protection of ideas. See PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL
LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17 (1994) (hereinafter ALCES & SEE).
's The book's dust jacket softens the impact by stating "copyright and patent issues."
'
6 GALLER, supra note 3, at 2.
17 Id. at X. Galler's view is not universally held. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT,
PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 867 (rev. 3d ed. 1993) ("Computer
programs present special problems for trade secret protection.").
'8 Some states also provide for trademark protection. See ALCES & SEE, supra note 14,
at 18. Such state based protection, however, falls outside the domain of this discussion.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as amended).
20 The design patent (also termed an ornamental patent) represents yet another area of
intellectual property law recently employed to protect computer software. A design patent
differs from the more commonly recognized utility patent in a number of factors. Further
discussion of design patent protection extends beyond the scope of Galler's book because the
value of its protection remains speculative in relation to the expense in obtaining the patent, and
it is not generally perceived as a primary means to protect software. For a cogent discussion of
the software-related design patent, see Daniel J. Kiuth & Steven W. Lundberg, Design Patents:
A NewForm ofntellectual Property for Computer Software, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1988, at
1. See generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION OF DESIGN
PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR COMPUTER-GENERATED ICONS, 61 Fed. Reg. 11380-11382 (Mar.
20, 1996) (effective Apr. 19, 1996).
2115 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994), amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-465, § 531, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (amending sections 1052 and 1127).
1 John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
23 "Although historically trade dress infringement consisted of copying a product's
packaging,... 'trade dress' in its more modem sense [could also] refer to the appearance of the
[product] itself .... IdealToy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 80 n.2 (3d Cir.
1982).
1 For a sampling ofthe scholarship addressing the intersection of software with trademark
law, see Richard Armstrong Beutel, Trade Dress Protection for the "Look and Feel" of
Software: The Lanham Act as an Emerging Source of Property Rights Protection for Software
Developers, 71 J. PAT. &TRADEMARKOFF. SOc'Y 974 (1989); Carl Caslowitz, "Trade Dress"
[Vol.5:119
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results from the belief that software screens are "highly visible, identifiable
features of a product," and therefore worthy of trade dress protection.25
Because Galler's legal experience remains confined to copyright and patent
law, it is understandable that he declines to address this area. For complete-
ness, however, his book should discuss the expansion of trade dress law to
software displays, its rationale, the value of such protection, and the test for
infringement with respect to software-a most controversial area of law."
Galler further narrows his venture by concentrating strictly on domestic
regimes, thereby excluding foreign and international protection systems.27
Such a limitation remains agreeable given the dominance of the United States
as both a consumer and supplier of software. Readers should also find this
exclusively domestic focus acceptable to the extent that the publisher's spatial
constraints would have precluded anything more than a cursory discussion of
international environments.
B. THE BOOK'S CONCLUSION
After Galler narrows the book's scope in the introductory chapter, the
next ten chapters survey the intersection of software with copyright or patent
law. These teachings possess a traditional and unpretentious quality; Section
III of this review addresses the specifics of chapters 1 through 10 in greater
detail. Chapter 11,28 Where Are We Now?, serves as the book's closing
reflection.
To provide a foundation for his conclusion in Chapter 11, Galler reviews
the copyright system and presents some recent patent law developments. 29 He
ultimately contends that despite the inherent weaknesses in these systems,
and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Protection for Total Image of the Visual Display of
Software Application, 33 IDEA 187 (1993); George Likourezos, Trademark Law in the
Computer Age: Applying Trademark Principles to the "Look and Feel" of Software, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 451 (1995); Rhoda L. Rudnick, Window Dressing:
TrademarkProtection for Computer Screen Displays and Software, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 382
(1990) (hereinafter Rudnick); Matthew E. Watson, Trade Dress Theory and the Software
Graphic User Interface: Sorting Through the Gooey Mess, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 251 (1994);
Gregory J. Wrenn, Comment, Federal Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software
AudiovisualLook and Feel: The Lanham, Copyright, and Patent Acts, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 279
(1989) (hereinafter Wrenn); Steven Shortgen, Note, "Dressing Up" Software Interface
Protection: The Application of Two Pesos to "Look and Feel," 90 CORNELL L. REv. 172
(1994).
Rudnick, supra note 24, at 398.
The dispute surrounds the preclusion of trade dress protection for functional elements,
and the level of functionality in software displays. See, e.g., Wrenn, supra note 24, at 288-91.
GALLEP,, supra note 3, at 136.
s Id. at 133-37.
29Id. at 133-35.
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copyright and patent law will eventually mature into a regime superior to any
other one available,30 and, therefore, the tandem should continue as the
primary regulatory vehicle of software protection. Regrettably, this chapter
does not explore Galler's conclusion, nor does it sufficiently consider com-
peting proposals of commentators suggesting alternative forms of software
protection 3 I
To buttress his conclusion advising continued adherence to a regime
requiring additional maturation and evolution, the book should have addressed
essential public policy concerns. Principally, Galler must reconcile his view
with leading commercial enterprise theories such as Max Weber's assertion
that developing an effective commercial venture requires deterministic laws to
encompass its activities.32 Acceptance of Weber's notion implies that Galler's
desire to remain with the existing immature regime potentially endangers an
industry essential to the nation;33 for this reason alone, Galler should detail his
position. In the absence of such a discussion, the author's conclusion fails to
persuade.
30 1d. at 133, 136.
31 For an example of works that could have been used to further address the subject, see
BRANSCOMB, supra note 2 at 154-58 (suggesting that software may warrant "its own system
of legal protection"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to
Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'LL. & POL. 897 (1988); Elmer Galbi, Proposal
for New Legislation to Protect Computer Programming 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 280
(1969); Irwin R. Gross, A New Frameworkfor Software Protection: Distinguishing Between
Interactive and Non-Interactive Aspects of Computer Programs, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 107 (1994); Peter Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
STAN. L. REv. 2308 (1987); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent
Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351 (1993); Samuelson, Manifesto, supra
note 4; Richard H. Stem, Solving the Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994 in the Federal
Circuit Patent Law Needs a Radical Algorithmectomy, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 167, 213-33 (1994)
(hereinafter Stem). See generally Dennis Karjala, Lessons from the Computer Software
Protection Debate in Japan, 1984 Aiz. ST. L.J. 53; Roland Liesegang, German Utility Models
Afer the 1990 Reform Act, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (1992) (presenting aspects of the German short-
term duration, registration regime for the protection of invention); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Comment, Copyright Protection for ASIC Configurations: PLDs, Custom and Semicustom
Chips, 42 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1989) (suggesting that hardware and software should have
similar protection, thereby allowing the marketplace to better balance the level of investment in
each).
32 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 883 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1968).
" See Kenneth I. Catalanotto, Computer Software: Federal Policy for a Critical
Technology, IEEE TECH. & SOC'Y MAG., Winter 1993, at 7, 8 ("Software is one of America's
most lucrative industries, [and] a key supporting technology within several other industries that
have both economic and military importance to the U.S."). See also Europe's Software
Debacle, THm ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 1994, at 77 (stating that European software companies are
hindered by the absence of legal uniformity).
[Vol.5:119
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With regard to Galler's secondary conclusion, rejecting the creation of a
regime designed specifically for software protection (the sui generis solution),
the book's analysis disappoints. The author proffers no explanation of his
rationale for rejecting promulgation of an entirely new legal regime addressing
software, apart from the personal opinion that it "does not appear to be
useful."34 In addition to the ample scholarship on the subject, 35 one ready
source for Galler's analysis rests in the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984.36 This Act is a recent example of a congressionally-crafted protection
regime for a single technology.37 The book overlooks the opportunity to
attempt to analogize a software-specific protection regime with recent
condemnations of the semiconductor-specific legislation as obsolete and
valueless. 38
Some commentators may dismiss as moot the criticism of the absent
detailed analysis of a sui generis solution. Such commentators would assert
that, given the unlikelihood that Congress will undertake the formidable task
of establishing an appropriate protection regime for computer software,39 the
34 GALLER, supra note 3, at 136.
35 See supra note 31.
36Pub. L. No. 98-120 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14); See also H.R. REP. No. 98-181,
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750.
Galler would not be the first, however, to explore the sui generis protection of computer
software in light of the sui generis protection for semiconductor masks. See, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson, Creating a New Kind ofIntellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip
Law to Programs, 70 MINN. L. REv. 471 (1985).
37 An example ofanothersui generis solution addressing plants, see The Plant Protection
Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 376, amended by 68 Stat. 1190 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 161-64; The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 82 Stat. 1542
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq.), amended by Plant Variety Protection Act
Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 103 Stat. 3143; See also PETER D. ROSENBERG,
PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 601 (2d ed. 1994).
38 See, e.g., Steven P. Kasch, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Past, Present,
and Future, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 71 (1992); John G. Rauch, The Realities of Our Times: The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and the Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry,
75 J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'VY93 (1993).
39 See, e.g., DAvID SCHOENBROD, PoWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 102-05 (1994) (finding that Congress fails to
undertake the difficult and complex decisions necessary to guide society, rather Congress
abdicates its authority by delegating the work to executive agencies and the Judicial Branch).
cf Stephen Breyer, Reforming Regulation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984) ("At the outset, let me
limit my skepticism to regulatory reform of a certain kind: reform that radically changes the
substantive nature of a regulatory program by embodying its changes in a new statute.").
The goal of establishing the optimally appropriate level of protection remains impossible
given the myriad of unquantifiable factors in the equation. For Congress, the goal of finding an
appropriate level of protection resides in addressing: "the dilemma... that without a legal
monopoly not enough infornation will be produced but with the monopoly too little information
will beused." ROBERTCOOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAWAND ECONOMICS 135 (1988). See also
1996]
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book's practical nature does not require it to engage in the academic pursuit
of addressing improbable congressional action. This position, however, does
not obviate the need to justify a position with fact and reason, not simply
conjecture. In the aggregate, it would have been preferable to avoid the sui
generis discussion entirely, rather than having Galler present his perspective
without an accompanying analysis.
C. THE BOOK AS A WHOLE
As a whole, Software and Intellectual Property Protection provides a
conventional teaching of the application of copyright and patent law funda-
mentals to software. Each chapter succinctly chronicles the history of the law
it covers. Throughout the text, Galler freely offers his opinion of the current
jurisprudence, but he carefully distinguishes the idyllic state of law from the
actual state of the law. This differentiation provides greater weight to his
criticisms. Additionally, Galler avoids making any significant legal misstate-
ments, a potential pitfall for all scholars, especially those without formal legal
training.
40
Two aspects of Galler's work deserve special recognition: the thirty-two
case briefs, and the computer science primer in Appendix A. Galler provides
the reader with a brief of each major case cited. Although visually distinct
from their accompanying textual discussion, Galler appropriately places the
thirty-two briefs within the surrounding analysis. The briefs mirror the
diligent first-year law student's reading notes; they include the parties, the
citation, the court of jurisdiction, the decision date, a relevant factual sum-
mary, and the holding. These briefs, averaging only two-thirds of a page in
length, are an outstanding budgeting of the book's limited space and should
become a treasured resource for practitioners requiring a quick summary of
key cases in the field. For this task, the briefs' omission of the procedural and
secondary substantive issues make them preferable to the synopses and
headnotes found in case reporters.
As for the 36-page teaching of computer science basics in Appendix A,4'
it comes as no surprise that Galler demonstrates a mastery of the field. The
examples and illustrations allow readers to glean sufficient knowledge to
THOMAS BADINGTON MACAULAY, PROSE AND POETRY 731, 733-37 (G. Young ed. 1967);
William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. L. STUD.
325 (1989).
'0 See, ag., John E. Nowak, Attacking the Judicial Protection of Minority Rights: The
History Ploy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 608, 621 (1986) (book review) (commenting on the legal
scholarship of a professor of history, the reviewer opined that "Professor Morgan [the book's
author] might have saved himself from making some embarrassing statements about Supreme
Court decisions if he had received a lawyer's advice...
", GALLER, supra note 3, at 141-77.
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understand many of the inherent complexities software brings to intellectual
property law. An asset for beginning and intermediate students of the
technology, Appendix A minimizes the need for readers to consult a separate
computer science text while using this book.
For Software and Intellectual Property Protection to reach its full
potential as a valuable resource, however, three modifications should be
implemented in future additions: (1) provide a more thorough introduction to
the basic attributes of the copyright and patent systems; (2) update and
expand the patent law discussion; and (3) improve the citation to authority.
Within the book's early chapters, the copyright and patent systems
should provide a broader introduction to the remaining discussions and
comport with the book's goal of presenting accessible teachings.42 Because
the practice of patent law requires specific scientific or technical background
(as well as passage of an examination to practice before the Patent and
Trademark Office),43 the intersection of copyright and patent practitioners is
smaller than their union. Accordingly, a discussion of the regimes' basic
attributes would have been appropriate for practitioners less versed in either
area, as well as the intellectual property law novitiate.
The introduction should discuss, at a minimum, each system's legal
infrastructure, the notion of copyright registration versus patent examination,
and the duration of each form of protection. Galler could have developed
many of the systems' other characteristics in later chapters, but lacking the
prefatory teaching, the book risks losing much of its intended legal audience.
Finally, a basic table or chart illustrating the similarities and distinctions of
the two systems would prove valuable.44
The second recommended modification is expanding the treatment of
patent law. Although the details of the patent law discussion are presented
below, at this stage it is sufficient to suggest that, given the complexity and
diversity of the issues addressed, a less austere treatment of patent law
fundamentals would improve future editions. Although the author does
present the existing 15-page discussion of the subject with minimal padding,
its coverage ultimately proves too thin. A more systematic approach, similar
to the multi-chapter treatment of copyright law, would enable the reader to
grasp the dimensions of this jurisprudence. Ultimately, the goal of these
added chapters should be to probe the substantive contours of patent law that
affect software.
42 See id. at X.
4' 37 C.F.R. § 10.5-10.8. See also Michelle J. Burke & Thomas G. Field, Jr.,
Promulgating Requirements for Admission to Prosecute Patent Applications, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 369 (1995).
44 For an example of this type of chart, see MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT LAW 26 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter LEAFFER); 1 MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON
COMPUTER LAw, table 2.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1993).
19961
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The third recommended modification is improving the citations to
authority. From a substantive perspective, the cited authority should be
expanded to clarify secondary ideas and to include sources of additional
research for interested readers.45 When discussing the basic concept of
patenting software, for example, the book could have listed writings highlight-
ing the rift in the legal community on this subject.46 Although legal scholar-
ship represents secondary authority, it performs an important role as a conduit
for enhancing thought, insight, and explanation.47
The form of Galler's citation to authority exacerbates the substance
problem. First, the book should not mix in-line text citations and notes. 48
Second, the book's publisher chose to employ endnotes instead of footnotes,
even though most legal scholarship uses footnotes. Footnotes eliminate the
unnecessary shuffling of pages between text and notes that endnotes intro-
duce.49 Although the issues of form do not affect the substantive value of the
citations, they distract sufficiently enough to require correction in future
editions.
Suggested modifications aside, one general concern on the decision to
publish a work addressing this tenaciously dynamic area of law in bound book
form. More appropriate forms include loose leaf volumes or books with
pocket parts or bound supplements. Although Galler's teachings regarding
the substantive law are thorough, the text has already fallen victim to what
President Lincoln might have referred to as the law seeking to "follow, and
4 Some scholars, of course, would find such modifications repugnant. See, e.g., Abner
J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 647, 647 (1985) (terming footnotes,
"wherever they may be found," an "abomination."); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23
VA. L. REV. 38, 41 (1936) ("[T]he footnote foible breeds nothing but sloppy thinking, clumsy
writing, and bad eyes.").
4 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Survey on the Patent/Copyright Interface for Computer
Programs, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 256, 259-61 (1989) (discussing a survey of 26 attorneys and
highlighting the division of opinion among attorneys regarding patent protection for software.
Although Samuelson concedes that the survey sample is small, she believes that the results "are
at least one useful data point (and, at present, probably the best data point we have)."). Id. at
259. John P. Sumnar & Steven W. Lundberg, Software Patents: Are They Here to Stay?, THE
COMPUTER LAW., Oct. 1991, at 8 (presenting the opinions of one group of attorneys strongly
favoring patent protection for software).
" See generally Symposium on Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv., No. 8 (1993);
Symposium on Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE L.J., No. 5 (1981). But
see Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MIcH. L. Rnv. 34 (1992) (commenting that legal scholarship provides minimal
value to practitioners, judges, or legislators).
48 See, e.g., GALLER, supra note 3, at 2-3, 12, 30-31, 38, 49, 105, 107.
49 This book review is not the first to criticize the use of endnotes. See, e.g., Mark
Tushnet, The Culture(s) ofFree Expression, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1106, 1106 n. 1 (1991) (book
review) ("Endnotes deter readers from reading them .... ).
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conform to, the progress of society."'5 For example, since this book's recent
publication, the Patent Office has issued new guidelines for the examination
of software related inventions,51 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has ruled on many significant software patent cases, 2 and the
Supreme Court has created un-certainty regarding user interface protection of
software with respect to copyright. 3 Of course, a timeliness concern exists
with nearly every published work, but, as evident from the quantum of activity
since this book's publication, it is especially pronounced in this area of law.54
III. CHAPTER SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
The book's teaching chapters are comprised of two different discussions:
chapters 1 through 2, and 4 through 10 discuss copyright law and chapter 3
examines patent law. Each chapter of the copyright discussion represents a
5°Abraham Lincoln, Notes of Argument in Law Case (June 15, 1858), in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OFABRAHAM LINCOLN 459 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). Although he did riot
issue this statement in the context of intellectual property law, Lincoln keenly appreciated the
importance of copyrights and patents; he remains the only President to have earned a patent on
an invention (Patent No. 6,469, issued on May 22, 1849). TRAVIS BROWN, HISTORICAL FIRST
PATENTS: THE FIRST UNITED STATES PATENT FOR MANY EVERYDAY THINGS 148-49 (1994)
"Although Lincoln's invention never enjoyed any commercial success, his ability to appreciate
and evaluate new inventions did much to determine the future of this country". Id. at 149.
51 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER-RELATED
INVENTIONS, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996).
One commentator applied the moniker "the Year of the Algorithm" to 1994 as a result
of the abundance of cases addressing such issues in patent law. Stem, supra note 31, at 169.
The cases of significance include: In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that
there is lack of statutory subject matter for patent claims in which a mathematical algorithm is
implicit); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the "bubble
hierarchies" creation represents nothing more than a manipulation of ideas, falling outside the
domain of statutory subject matter); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that
the system of computer memory storage is not analogous to printed matter), and; In re Trovato,
42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the use of data structure to find the best route
between two locations represents only a mathematical calculation and is therefore nonstatutory),
vacatedper curiam, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For further discussions about these cases,
see Judson D. Cary, Not So Fast There Mr. Alappat: The Federal Circuit Retreats from the
Alappat DecWon, NEW MATTER, Winter 1994, at 28-31; James R. Goodman et al., Toward a
Fact-Based Standard for Determining Whether Programmed Computers are Patentable
Subject Matter: The Scientific Wisdom ofAlappat and Ignorance of Trovato, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 353, 354-65 (1995); Robert C. Laurenson, Computer Software
"Article ofManufacture" Patents, 21 COMP. L. REP. 965 (1995); Stem, supra note 31, at 187-
94.
For a description of the role of the Federal Circuit, see supra note 13.
1 See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
'Readers requiring a timely source of patent and copyright information should consult
the PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL which The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
publishes weekly.
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self-contained lesson, and, appropriately this review will examine each
chapter as such.5 This review also examines the patent law chapter in its own
light.
A. COPYRIGHT LAW CHAPTERS ANALYSIS
In Chapter 1,56 Legal Issues, Galler begins the instruction by identifying
six applications of traditional copyright jurisprudence to software which he
asserts yield unpredictable or undesirable results. Although not mentioned in
this chapter, these consequences result primarily from the application of
copyright law, a law initially designed to protect literary and artistic works, to
a new technology. 7 To the extent that the author employs this brief chapter
to promote continued reading by arousing the reader's curiosity, concern, or
consternation, he aptly succeeds.
Chapters 2 and 4 each present a threshold issue of copyright law: the
idea-expression dichotomy and fixation. Chapter 2,1' Idea or Expression?,
addresses the idea-expression dichotomy, a concept that demands a copyright
exists only on the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. 9 Galler accurately
" In addition, found after the textual discussions of chapters 1 through 11 are four
appendices and a recommended reading list. Appendix A explores basic computer science
concepts, a valuable set of teachings for non-technical readers. GALLER, supra note 3, at 141-
77. Appendix B reproduces a patent used for illustration purposes in Chapter 3. Id. at. 179-90.
Appendix C reprints the In re Alappat concurrence. Id. at 191-94. Appendix D lists the
citations to the thirty-two case briefs that appear throughout the chapters. Id. at 195-97. The
final entry of the book, not including the able index, presents a recommended reading list often
additional sources. Id. at 199. The list demonstrates consideration of readers possessing an
interest in the subject beyond the provided teachings, but should be expanded to provide a more
panoramic range of scholarship.
6 Id. at 7-9.
17 See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 33, 41-43 (1987). See also Samuelson, Manifesto, supra note 4, at 2350
("Copyright law is mismatched to software, in part, because it does not focus on the principal
source of value in a program (its useful behavior)."). It is ironic that this new technology
possess such a challenge to copyright law. "Copyright was technology's child from the start
[because] [t]here was no need for copyright before the printing press." PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
CoPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 27 (1994).
5 GALLER, supra note 3, at 11-28.
59 The general teaching of the idea-expression dichotomy is found in section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, which states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery .... 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). The generally accepted basis of the
codification of the dichotomy is an amalgamation of two historic copyright cases: Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879) and Mazerv. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[c], n.30 (1994).
For a detailed discussion of the idea-expression dichotomy, see Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking
to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1221 (1993). For a
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describes this construct as "[o]ne of the most fundamental issues in copyright
law."'  To circumscribe the bounds of the idea-expression dichotomy and the
concomitant merger doctrinea' with respect to software, Chapter 2 details a
wealth of thoughtfully selected cases. As one copyright law scholar com-
ments: "The idea-expression dichotomy. . . is easy to state but is more
difficult and elusive to apply in practice... [and, therefore,] is best examined
in a specific context."62 Accordingly, Galler's teachings in this chapter are
valuable in light of the confusion over the application of the maxim to
software.
Chapter 4,63 The Tangible Medium, considers the threshold issue of
fixation. The fixation requirement dictates that the law extend copyright
protection only to permanent or stable works, not transitory works such as
oral statements or unwritten and unrecorded music. 64 This chapter focuses on
three seminal software cases, each decided between 1982 and 1984: Williams
Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,65 which found object code meets the fixation
requirement; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,66 which
found that source code meets the fixation requirement; Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,67 which found that software fixed in read only memory
(ROM) does not constitute an idea, procedure, system, or method of opera-
discussion of the idea-expression dichotomy applied specifically to software, see John H.
Pilarski, User Interfaces and the Idea-Expression Dichotomy, or, Are the Copyright Laws
Friendly?, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 325 (1987); Peter G. Spivack, Comment, Does Form Follow
Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software,
35 UCLA L. REv. 723 (1988).
60 GALLER, supra note 3, at 11.
61 "The merger doctrine represents a variation of the idea/expression dichotomy...
[-]hen the idea and the expression of the idea coincide, the expression will not be protected.
... [A]n expression will be found to be merged into the idea when 'there are no or few other
ways of expressing a particular idea."' Educational Testing Services v. Kalzman, 793 F.2d 533
(3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 787 F.2d 1240,
1253, (8th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The primary public policy
rationale behind the merger doctrine is preventing monopolization of an idea by copyrighting
one of the few methods of expressing it. Toro Company v. R&R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208,
1212 (8th Cir. 1986).
62LEAFFER, supra note 44, at 58.
GALLER, supra note 3, at 47-53.
'The fixation requirement, rooted in the constitutional grant for "writings" exclusively,
has been codified by Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976, and states that "[a] work is 'fixed'
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy... is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
65685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
6714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
67 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
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tion, and therefore remains eligible to receive copyright protection. As a
result of tracing the history of software and fixation, this chapter teaches a
legal point uncontested since the early 1980's: software meets the threshold
fixation requirement.
Chapter 5,68 Validity and Scope, addresses three potential generic
defenses to rebut a charge of copyright infringement. 69 The three defenses are
whether the work in question: (1) bears the appropriate copyright notification
markings; (2) falls outside the scope of copyright law; and (3) lacks original-
ity. Any concerns pertaining to the appropriateness of teaching defenses prior
to teaching infringement are misplaced, as the book's organization follows the
classic four step intellectual property law analysis: (1) Does an enforceable
intellectual property right exist? (2) Who owns the intellectual property right?
(3) Has infringement occurred? and (4) What are the available remedies?7"
Within this methodology, chapter 5 speaks to the step 1 analysis, as do
chapters 2 and 4; specifically, whether there exists an enforceable intellectual
property right.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8, in various incarnations, present copyright infringe-
ment. Chapter 6,"' Infringement, begins with a lay dictionary definition of
infringement, an inappropriate source given that copyright law supplies a
statutory definition.72 This peccadillo aside, chapter 6 provides a rounded
68 GALLER, supra note 3, at 55-66.
69 This chapter understates the frequency at which an alleged infringing party will raise
the validity issue to "just clear cases of infringement." Id. at 57. Other observers, however, find
that most defendants routinely proffer such a argument, not simply the obvious infringers. See,
e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
habit of charging inequitable conduct [,which if found to exist would render the obtained patent
unenforceable,] in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.").
70 The book focuses strictly on the areas of copyright and patent law that are unique in
application to software. GALLER, supra note 3, at X, 2. Because issues of ownership and
available remedies are not unique in application to software, the text does not present them. The
book's domain justifies such omissions.
I' d. at 67-76.
72 Violating any of a copyright holder's exclusive rights constitutes copyright
infringement 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994). Subject to §§ 107-120 of title 17, a copyright owner
has "the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,




survey of copyright infringement fundamentals. Chapter 7,3 Substantial
Similarity, highlights one of the tests of copyright infringement as applied to
software.74 Here, Galler adroitly blends instruction with concrete examples in
order to teach the essentials of an inquiry which the author rightfully states
may rapidly become "complicated."75
Chapter 8,76 Look and Feel, dissects the protection, and subsequent
infringement, of non-literal elements of software-a model known as "look
and feel." The look and feel concept presumes that software is akin to a play,
movie, or novel, in that there exists protectable themes and structures.7 7 This
chapter devotes most of its breath to canvassing Lotus Development Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l., a case which planted the seeds for the Second
Circuit's interpretation of look and feel.7" Although Galler participated in this
trial as an expert witness, cynics should not dismiss the abundant teaching as
indulgent self-promotion. In counterdistinction, Lotus v. Paperback illus-
trates the Second Circuit's three-prong test for assessing which non-literal
aspects of a software item should be afforded copyright protection.79 This
chapter, which includes diagrams, furnishes readers with an understanding of
the test's development and application. Currently, however, a split exists
among the circuit courts regarding the propriety of the three-prong test. In
1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc.,"° rejected the Second Circuit's test.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
' GALLER, supra note 3, at 77-89.
7' For a detailed discussion of the methods available to prove substantial similarity, see
Donald F. McGahn II, Copyright Infringement of Protected Computer Software: An
Analytical Method to Determine Substantial Similarity, 21 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
88, 113-31 (1995).
75 GALLER, supra note 3, at 77.
761d. at 91-104.
'See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989). This form of copyright protection has been termed
the "second generation" of software copyright cases. Id. at 1048.
78 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
1Id. 59-62. In essence, the three-prong test requires: (1) abstraction; (2) filtration; and
(3) comparison. Id. This three-prong test was formally adopted by the Second Circuit in a later-
amended opinion which left the test itself unchanged. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
Nos. 762, 91-7893, 91-79351992, WL 139364, at *12-18 (2d Cir. June, 22, 1992),
withdrawn and superseded on reh'g by 982 F.2d 693, 706-711 (2d Cir. 1992). In a
subsequent trial following Paperback, with the same plaintiff, the same court, and same judge
as Paperbadk and prior to the release of the amended opinion in Altai, Judge Keeton attempted
to adopt this three-prong test in the Massachusetts' district court but was reversed on appeal.
See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 211-212, 216-219 (D. Mass.
1992), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
1149 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). Academics also have quibbled with the Second Circuit's
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The court found the disputed user-interface to be highly utilitarian and,
consequently, outside the scope of copyright law.8 The First Circuit's
appellate decision apparently postdates the book's editorial deadline, thus
explaining the absent analysis of the ideological divide. 2 The Supreme
Court's recent decision 3 fell in a 4-4 split, offering little guidance on the
issue.84
Chapter 9,8" Reverse Engineering, addresses the activity of "starting
with the known product and working backwards to divine the process which
aided in its development or manufacture."86 Reverse engineering represents
an especially weighty issue for competing companies that seek to conform
with specialized and secretive interface specifications, a concept known as
interoperability.87 Chapter 9 remains an acceptable, albeit laconic, discussion
of the existing law in this congested intersection of software and intellectual
property protection.
interpretation of copyright law. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User
Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v.
Paperback, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 209 (1991).
See supra note 12. The court also acknowledged that its holding directly conflicts with
the recent Tenth Circuit decision in Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994
F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993) by essentially declaring the
holding dicta. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l; Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818-819 (1st Cir. 1995).
82For commentary on the First Circuit's decision, see Jonathan Band, Lotus v. Borland
Through the Lens of Interoperability, THE COMPUTER LAW., June 1995, at 1; Anthony L.
Clapes & Jennifer M. Daniels, Lotus v. Borland: Nightmare on Milk Street?, THE COMPUTER
LAW., May 1995, at 16.
83 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam) ("The
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affinned by an equally
divided CourL JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.")
This was the entire opinion of the Court.
14 A 4-4 decision applies only to the decided case, and has no precedential value. See
JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30 (5th ed. 1995) (citing
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972); Etting v. Bank of the United States, 24 U.S. (11
Wheat) 59,78 (1826); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 126 (1825); Durant v. Essex
Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1868)).
8sGALLER, supra note 3, at 105-23.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (providing a definition of
reverse engineering).
87 For a recent discussion about the interoperability debate, see JONATHAN BAND &
MASANOBUKATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL (1995) (hereinafter BAND & KATOH); John T. Soma
et al., Software Interoperability and Reverse Engineering, 20 RurGERs COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 189 (1994); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Comment, Atari Games v. Nintendo: Does a Closed
System Violate theAntitrustLaws?, 5 HIGH TECH L.J. 29 (1990). For purposes of comparison,
see two recent articles exploring the international experience: Sunny Handa, Reverse
Engineering Computer Programs Under Canadian Copyright Law, 40 MCGILL L.J. 621.
(1995); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering in the
United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH L.J. 25 (1993).
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Chapter 10,88 The Clean Room Approach, offers one potential method
of reverse engineering which Galler asserts should not vest infringement
liability. This chapter suggests a procedure for undertaking reverse engineer-
ing by isolating specific members of the development team from either
examining the competitor's product or working on the company's own
development effort. Galler ends his presentation with high expectations for
the concept: "While the clean room concept has not been tested in court, I
expect it to be an effective device in the computer field."89 Another set of
authors presenting the same clean room approach, however, warn that it may
"fail to shelter" the group engaged in the activity because "the reverse
engineering necessary to derive the interface specification may involve
copying," and that such copying, in specific circumstances, could infringe the
"competitor's copyright before any information even reached the clean
room."9 Further, parties recommending or implementing the clean room
approach should recall that its creators fashioned it to address copyright
concerns, and the approach would fail to immunize against patent infringe-
ment liability. This distinction, which the book does not clearly articulate,
rests on the premium that copyright law places on originality,9" and patent
law's highly distinct importance of originality, where even unintentional
making, using, or selling, of another's patented invention provides a prima
facie case for patent infringement.92
88 GALLEP, supra note 3, at 125-31.
I91d. at 130.
9 BAND & KATOH, supra note 87, at 69.
9' See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (1994). Originality is comprised of two elements: (1)
independent creation; and (2) "some minimal degree of creativity." Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340,345 (1992) (citation omitted). Independent creation
"means little more than a prohibition on actual copying." Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C.
Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 538, 586 (D.C.N.Y. 1929). For additional treatment of the originality
requirement, see DONALD S. CISUM & MICHAEL A JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW § 4C[5] (1992); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NIMmER ON
COPYRIGHT §§ 1.08[C], 2.01[A]-[B] (1994).
' Compare Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'd,
309 U.S. 390 (1940) (Hand, J.) (citations omitted) ("[A]nticipation as such cannot invalidate
a copyright... [I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew
Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might
not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's... .") with Van Kannell
Resolving Door Co. v. Revolving Door & F'xture Co., 293 F. 261,262 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) (Hand,
J.) (citations omitted) ("[A patentee] may prevent any one from making, selling, or using a
structure embodying the invention, but the monopoly goes no further than that. It restrains
every one from the conduct so described.... ").
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B. PATENT LAW CHAPTER ANALYSIS
Chapter 3,93 Software Patents, contains the book's major patent law
discussion. This chapter interrupts chapter 2's and 4's study of threshold
copyright issues with a survey of patent law as applied to software-a
counterintuitive location. The chapter begins with Diamond v. Diehr,94 a
pivotal 1981 Supreme Court decision that indicated software could qualify for
patent protection.95 The decision, however, was narrowly tailored such that
the software must remain tied to a physical process.96 Chapter 3 then ad-
dresses other consequential software cases, yet it overlooks possibly the most
significant case decided in the fifteen years since Diehr, In re Alappat.97
In the 1994 decision of Alappat, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, stated that software running a general
purpose computer embodies a patentable subject matter regardless of ties to
a physical process.98 This broader notion of patentable subject matter results
from the court finding that a general purpose computer in effect becomes a
special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform a particular
function pursuant to instructions from program software.99 Regrettably,
93 GALLER, supra note 3, at 29-45.
14 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (5-4 decision).
9 The Supreme Court stated that "courts 'should not read into the patent laws limitations
and conditions which a legislature has not expressed'. ... Congress intended statutory subject
matter to 'include anything under the sun that is man made."' Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
96 In Diehr, the software monitored the processing of molded synthetic rubber, which
included the non-computer steps of. pre-heating molds, loading synthetic rubber into the molds,
monitoring the mold temperature, and based on the software's algorithm opening the mold.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 180 n.5. See also James Allan Stuckey, Note, Patent Law-Process Claim
Involving Computer Program Meets Statutory Subject Matter Requirements, 56 TUL. L. REV.
785 (1982).
17 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (writing for six of the eleven presiding
members ofthe court, Judge Rich expressed the plurality view. Two members dissented on the
merits and three judges declined to address the merits, finding the court lacked proper
jurisdiction to hear the case). See also James R. Goodman et al., The Alappat Standard for
Determining that Programmed Computers are Patentable Subject Matter, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 771 (1994).
One could make a legitimate argument that the most important software/patent case since
Diehr is In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (1995).
98 Patentable subject matter is the term given to the area of science and technology for
which a patent is available. Patent law permits one to patent a process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Patents on additional items are available.
See, e.g., id. §§ 161-64 (plant patent provisions).
9 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (citations omitted).
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chapter 3 overlooks Alappat, leaving the unsuspecting reader to discover this
case eight chapters later in the conclusion, chapter 11.10
In addition to the presentation of software as a patentable subject matter,
chapter 3 examines the legal requirements defining patentability and the
jurisprudence addressing patent scope. Galler also provides a balanced
discussion of the procedural challenges facing the patent system by software;
specifically, he summarizes the current problems, potential solutions, and
existing safeguards. ' l
IV. CONCLUSION
With few exceptions, Software and Intellectual Property Protection
employs engaging prose and skillful exposition to provide a solid teaching of
the basics of copyright and patent law and software. The book identifies a
number of intriguing issues; however, readers requiring a detailed analysis of
the intersection of copyright or patent and software should consult additional
scholarship. Implementing the three modifications suggested, as wel as
inclusion of more timely discussions, would enhance future editions of the
book. For now, the strength of the thirty-two briefs, peppered throughout the
text, and the sagacious teaching of computer science in Appendix A, make
this book a welcomed supplementary source.
See GALLER, supra note 3, at 135.
1 Within this discussion, one statement made by the author worthy of correction is the
unsupported point that the first group of computer science Patent Examiners, a group which
once included the author of this book review, will be promoted to the level of Primary Examiner
in two years, id. at 36, instead of the typical five to seven years. Computer science Patent
Examiners follow the same promotion path as Examiners from other scientific disciplines.
19961

